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 Decades of historically unprecedented growth in the Post-War era in
 
Japan and the East Asian tigers has not only physically transformed the
 
region but also engendered a profound intellectual shift. Once the
 
backwater trapped in long-term poverty and stagnation, East Asia
 
today becomes the buzzword of miracles and models.This has led to
 
the general formulation of an East Asian model of growth founded on
 
factors such as human capital accumulation,export-orientation,close
 
cooperation between government and the private sector,and the culti-
vation of internal and long-term relationships as an alternative or a
 
challenge to the neo-classical free-market, private property rights
 
model based on the Western historical experience.China’s remarkable
 
economic growth since her emergence out of political isolation from the
 
late-1970s brings a further endorsement to the East Asian model with
 
the weight of a billion people.It is often argued that the crucial institu-
tional factors that accounted for the two decades of economic miracles
 
in China-ranging from household responsibility system, the township
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Debin MA?
Lawand Commercein Traditional
 
China :An Institutional Perspective
 
on the“Great Divergence”
＊ I benefited from discussion with Larry Neal,Sevket Pamuk,Osamu Saito,Masayuki
 
Tanimoto and also comments at the Global Economic History Network (GEHN)
workshop at Leiden,Holland in Sept.2004 where I presented an earlier version of this
 
paper.I alone remain responsible for all the errors.
and village enterprise, to the overseas Chinese networks of FDIs to
 
China -were largely informal,spontaneous and often ad-hoc.Yet they
 
brought an enviable growth record in the past two decades in outstand-
ing contrast to the economic collapse and dislocation in the formerly
 
Communist countries of Russia and Eastern Europe that had opted for
 
the so-called “shock therapy,”an ideology more in tune with the
 
orthodox Western neoclassical economic ideal.
Waves of historical revisionism seem to come in tandem with cycles
 
of economic growth. In the 1970s and 1980s,a revisionist view emerged
 
to argue that the origin of modern economic growth in Japan should be
 
traced all the way back to the pre-Meiji period(before 1868),which had
 
long been dismissed by the dominant Marxist school as stagnant and
 
backward.On the contrary,cumulative social and economic progress in
 
the Tokugawa era (1600-1867)prepared Japan far better than other
 
developing countries(including China)to embark on a path of moderni-
zation and industrialization??.
With the Japanese economy faltering for the last two decades,revi-
sionist impulses have shifted to 18th century China. In recent years,
revisionist scholarship has taken to task the long-term stagnation thesis
 
on Chinese economic history. They contend for a case of substantial
 
progress in industrial and agricultural technologies, expansion of
 
regional trade,growth in urbanization,and perhaps even demographic
 
transition for early modern China. In his influential book, “Great
 
Divergence,”Kenneth Pomeranz singled out China’s most advanced
 
region of Lower Yangzi,which through intensification in land utiliza-
tion,development of labor-using,energy-saving technology and expan-
1）See Nakamura and Miyamoto(1982).For a balanced summary of the optimistic revision
 
of Tokugawa economic history in Japan,see Yasuba (1987).
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sion of regional trade,had experienced the so-called Smithian growth,
comparable to that in Tokugawa Japan and early modern Europe.He
 
went on to claim that the nearly 300 years of economic expansion may
 
have put the level of development and living standard for the Lower
 
Yangzi on par with northwest Europe in the 18th century.
Were the initial conditions in China or East Asia as high as claimed,
how did industrial revolution eclipse East Asia? For Pomeranz, the
 
answer to this age-old question seems to lie in differences in resource
 
endowments:it was the absence of coal deposits in the Lower Yangzi
 
for China coupled with the natural resource windfall from the discovery
 
of New World for Europe that set off the great divergence after the
 
18th century??.
Do institutions matter? Yes,they do but the revisionists claimed that
 
property rights or the freedom to contract in traditional China was no
 
less secure or flexible than in Western Europe.Recent scholarships on
 
the traditional Chinese legal system challenges the Weberian interpre-
tation and conjures up a portrait of pre-modern China where property
 
rights were reasonably secure,the freedom to contract were pervasive,
and public enforcement of contracts was by and large rule-based??.
The causal link between legal institution and economic growth has
 
been extensively explored in the so-called “legal origins”literature
 
among growth and development economists.Unfortunately,their paro-
chial focus on Western legal traditions-whether common or civil law
2）See Ma (2004c) for a review of this revisionist scholarship. For recent quantitative
 
studies that show real wages in major urban centers in China and Japan are closer to
 
those in Southern and Central Europe rather than Northwestern Europe,see Allen et al
(2005)and Bassino,Ma and Saito (2005).
3）See Pomeranz (2000)on the flexibility of traditional Chinese factor markets.See Philip
 
Huang,Zelin et al for these revisionist studies on traditional Chinese legal system.
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systems were more efficient in promoting economic growth-largely
 
neglected pre-existing non-Western legal traditions, which, for most
 
developing countries today,formed their basic underlying structure of
 
economic and political institutions often under the guise of Western
 
legal lexicon.More importantly,in traditional societies,it was usually
 
the informal institutions and norms that played a much larger role in
 
regulating people’s economic lives. Studies focusing exclusively on
“formal”legal sectors are bound to be insufficient and even mislead-
ing??.
This paper makes a preliminary step to fill this lacuna and contrib-
utes to the “Great Divergence”debate by bringing a comparative
 
analysis of the differential evolution of Chinese and Western legal
 
institutions. It shows that in contrast to the Western legal tradition
 
which evolved towards the use of transcendental and fixed legal rules
 
or precedents by an independent legal class, the Chinese formal legal
 
system for civil and commercial affairs relied on vaguely defined
 
general principles and the mutual compromise of litigants. As a partial
 
substitute to a vaguely defined formal legal structure,a social order of
 
lineage or native-place based merchant communities emerged in China
 
to help secure properties and contracts, and reduce information and
 
transaction costs for trade and growth.This article proposes that,as
 
the Western type of rule-based system exhibits scale effects,being more
 
economically efficient at larger volumes and scales of transactions and
 
thus more conducive to impersonal exchange, divergent traditions in
 
legal knowledge and institutions carry important implications for the
“Great Divergence”thesis between China and the West. This difference
4）Ohnesorge(2003)provides a summary and criticism of the‘legal origins’literature.
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is also equally relevant for understanding both the absence of an
 
industrial revolution in East Asia in the early modern period and its
 
spectacular catch-up since the late 19th century.
The rest of the article is divided into three sections.The first section
 
reviews the traditional Chinese legal system in a comparative perspec-
tive.The second section examines the strategies of Chinese merchant
 
groups to ensure property rights and contract enforcement.The third
 
section compares the relative economic efficiencies of rule-based versus
 
relations-based regimes and their possible impact on long-term growth
 
trajectories.
．Law and Legal System in Traditional China
 
To examine the traditional Chinese legal system,the distinction by
 
Max Weber between formal and substantive justice appears to be a
 
useful starting point. Under formal justice, legal adjudication and
 
process for all individual legal disputes are bound by a set of gener-
alised and well-specified rules and procedures.Substantive justice,on
 
the other hand, seeks the optimal realisation of maximal justice and
 
equity in each individual case,often with due consideration to compre-
hensive factors,whether legal, moral, political or otherwise. Formal
 
justice tends to produce legal outcomes that are predicable and calcu-
lable,even though such outcomes may often clash with the substantive
 
postulates of religious,ethical or political expediency in any individual
 
case.Formal justice,as argued by Weber,reduces the dependency of
 
the individual upon the grace and power of the authorities,thus render-
ing it often repugnant to authoritarian powers and demagoguery.
Weber believed that formal justice is unique to the European legal
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system. The European legal organization was highly differentiated,
separate from the political authority and characterized by the existence
 
of specialized and autonomous professional legal class. Legal rules
 
were consciously fashioned and rulemaking was relatively free of direct
 
interference from religious influences and other sources of traditional
 
values.Above all,the rule of law born out of the Western legal tradition
 
supplied what Weber termed as calculability and predicability, ele-
ments essential for explaining the rise of Western capitalism and its
 
absence in other civilizations??.
Influenced by Weber and Unger,post-WWII Japanese legal scholar-
ship on the traditional Chinese justice system, as exemplified by the
 
work of Shuzo Shiga and others, is most notable for their careful
 
analysis based on the reading of archived legal cases.Shiga started out
 
with the well-known fact that the Chinese legal apparatus was an
 
integral part of the administrative system;the administrative bureau-
cracy within the hierarchy-from the county level to the emperor-were
 
the final arbiter in criminal cases. This feature is crucial for under-
standing that the Ming and Qing penal codes, despite their reputed
 
elaboration and comprehensiveness,were decision rules designed for
 
the bureaucrats to meter out punishments proportionate to the extent
 
of criminal violations. In fact, as pointed out by the Chinese legal
 
scholar,Liang Ziping,the text of the Qing legal codes was structurally
 
organized along the lines of the ministerial divisions under the Imperial
 
bureaucracy (Liang, 1996, p.128-9). Similarly, legal rulings can be
 
reviewed and changed only through the multiple layers of the bureau-
cracy within the administrative hierarchy. Legal statutes or sub-
5）Weber (1978),vol.II,p.812.Unger (1976)and Trubek (1972),p.721.
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statutes were not open to contestation and interpretation by the litigat-
ing parties or independent third parties.In this regard,legal studies in
 
China-if such a term applies in the Chinese context-are more a compila-
tion or editing of codes rather than an independent intellectual disci-
pline.
The fundamentally penal nature of the Chinese legal codes was not
 
amenable to resolution of disputes of a commercial and civil nature.
However, the county magistrates, the lowest level bureaucrats, did
 
handle and rule on legal disputes that did not entail any corporal
 
punishment. It has been shown now that a vast number of civil and
 
commercial cases were actually brought to and settled at the courts of
 
the county magistrates??.But Shiga pointed out that these county-level
 
trials were something more akin to a process of’didactic conciliation’,
a term he borrowed from the studies by Western scholars on the
 
Tokugawa legal system in Japan. The decisions of the magistrates
 
were not legal‘adjudications’as in the Western legal order.
Shiga emphasized that the Western concept of “adjudication”was
 
simply absent in Chinese legal thinking and procedure. The magistrate’s
 
ruling was effective and a legal case was considered as resolved or
 
terminated only to the point that both litigants consented to the settle-
ment and made no further attempts for appeals.Although not common,
Shiga did point to cases where a legal dispute dragged on indefinitely
 
when one of the litigating parties reneged on-sometime repeatedly-and
 
refused to fulfil his or her original agreement to the settlement.Thus,
ruling lacked the kind of binding and terminal force as the legal
 
abjudication in the modern sense.Shiga was also interested in the legal
6）For the extent of average people utilising the county level civil trial system,see Susumu
 
Fuma’s article in Shiga et al.and also Huang (1996).
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basis of magistrate’s rulings and found that although invoking general
 
ethical,social or legal norms, they rarely relied on or cited any specific
 
codes, customs or precedents. In accordance with its intermediation
 
characteristics, the magistrate’s ruling showed less concern for the
 
adoption of a reasonably uniform and consistent standard than the
 
resolution of each individual case with full consideration to its own
 
merits??.In fact,as also argued by Liang Ziping,the magistrate would
 
not hesitate to issue rulings that could result in the alteration or
 
simplification of the original agreements between the litigant parties if
 
this would help“quiet both parties”(pp.134-8).
This Weberian interpretation of traditional Chinese legal system was
 
vigorously contested by the recent legal revisionist scholars most
 
notably,by Philip Huang.Based on his reading of Qing archival legal
 
cases of civil disputes,Huang challenged Shiga’s thesis and demonstrat-
ed that the rulings of magistrates were far from being arbitrary but
 
rather,rooted in formal legal codes and seemed legally binding for most
 
of the cases.Huang’s sharply contrasting interpretation of the tradi-
tional Chinese legal system based on similar legal archives studied by
 
Shiga and others were both striking and puzzling.In a series of rebut-
tals, Shiga and his former student, Hiroaki Terada, seriously ques-
tioned the methodology that Huang adopted to arrive at his conclusion.
For example, Terada pointed out that even though there was no
 
evidence to show that the original rulings by the magistrates cited any
 
legal statues or local customs as their legal basis,Huang’s claim that
 
the magistrates ruled according to law was based on his own“discov-
ery”and matching of their rulings with what he deemed as the relevant
7）For Shiga’s analysis,see Shiga et al(1998),Shiga (2002,1996).
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codes in the formal Qing legal penal code(Shiga 1996 and Terada 1995).
Both the origin and evolution of the Western legal system present a
 
sharp contrast to that of China. The modern Western legal system had
 
its origin in the 13th century papal revolution which won the Church
 
legal autonomy from the secular authority.It was the Church’s jurists-
the Canonists -that began the systematic compilation and testing of
 
legal codes,which were to evolve into a new and independent science of
 
law.Their codification and rationalization of the diverse and extensive
 
customs in the Medieval West helped turn customary laws into relative-
ly consistent legal standards for the rulings by the court and claims by
 
the litigants (Harold Berman,Toby Huff,Jerome Bourgon 53-55).
Nonetheless, formal law especially in commercial affairs evolved
 
slowly partly because commercial disputes tended to be highly special-
ized and formal legal litigation and enforcement could be extremely
 
costly.Merchants in Medieval and early modern Europe relied exten-
sively on private solutions such as mediation and arbitration to resolve
 
commercial disputes.But over time,commercial customs and practices
 
became increasingly codified and unified especially in major trading
 
centers, often under the jurisdiction of relatively autonomous local
 
government or independent city-states.Major intellectual and political
 
revolutions such as the Reformation and the Enlightenment movement,
particularly the rise of modern nation-states became a major force that
 
propelled the formation of modern Civil Law through the amalgama-
tion and standardization of traditional customary laws in different
 
territories of jurisdiction??.
The fundamental but subtle distinction between the traditional
8）See Oscar Gelderblom(2005)for the rise of private and public institutions for resolving
 
commercial disputes in the Low Countries.
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Chinese and Western legal tradition has often been grossly misunder-
stood.In fact,as Bourgon argued,there is no equivalent legal term in
 
Chinese that corresponds exactly to the Western terminology for
“customs.”The direct transliteration of “custom”using the Chinese
 
word“xiguan,”which invoked a different social and cultural context,
may have accounted for our misconception over the fundamental gap
 
between the two legal traditions.“Customs”in the West was not merely
 
a sociological phenomenon but also a judicial artifact, asserted by
 
witnesses,or appreciated by the jury.They were codified and had clear
 
territorial delimitation. In contrast,“customs”in China,according to
 
Shiga and Bourgon, identifies only loose, mostly unwritten social
 
practices without territorial delineation.They might at times serve as
 
a reference but almost never formed the specific legal basis upon which
 
the county magistrates made their decisions or the litigants made their
 
claims.
If neither customs nor precedents formed the legal basis for a
 
magistrate’s ruling and if ruling was more like mediation rather than
 
adjudication, then the path which saw the gradual and cumulative
 
evolution from private customs and customary laws to formal and
 
public laws in the West, as argued by Shiga, became a cul-de-sac in
 
traditional China (Shiga et al, p.13-15). Liang Ziping made similar
 
points on what he termed as an insurmountable gulf between private
 
and customary rules and public laws in traditional China.His explana-
tion centres on the nature of the Chinese state whose paramount
 
interest was the maintenance of a largely agrarian-based fiscal base
 
and social stability and had little interest in private commercial
 
matters. Thus, when it comes to the resolution of highly complex
 
commercial disputes, the state or local magistrate leaned towards
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simplistic and flexible means rather than attempt to establish consis-
tent and generalizable rules or precedents (Liang, pp.138-140). In the
 
centralized empire with no other independent power structures such as
 
city-states or autonomous corporate bodies, the gulf between private
 
and public laws was impossible to close??.
This divergence in legal systems,as Shiga emphasised,should not be
 
viewed as an illustration of the shortfalls of the Chinese legal system in
 
the Western perspective,but on the contrary, they were the intended
 
consequence of the divergent cultural value systems.In the West,while
 
the ideals of legal rules, standards or precedents used to define the
 
rights and claims of individuals and groups strived to be consistent,
replicable,transcendental and inflexible;in China, the relative vague-
ness and generality in China’s legal system provided flexibility for
 
resolving disputes in accordance with the Confucian ideals of social
 
harmony. Inculcated in Confucian classics, the wise and venerable
 
magistrates or any other “arbitrators”would be deemed as a better
 
embodiment of social,legal and ethical justice than the external rules
 
that concern only legal rights and obligations.Thus,a perennial theme
 
in Chinese legal thoughts and history had been the emphasis on the
 
cultivation of the character and capability of bureaucrats.
．Chinese Merchants and Government Bureaucracy
 
Such a person-based legal system was clearly vulnerable in many
 
ways.In cases when the character and the ruling of the magistrate were
 
thrown into doubt,a process of endless appeals through the hierarchy
9）For the linkage between political decentralization and development of legal tradition in
 
Western Europe,see Greif(2005).
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of bureaucracy could often ensue. In other cases, the system became
 
highly susceptible to bureaucratic abuse and the rule of arbitrary
 
power.But how is it that for most parts of her history,social order in
 
China did not disintegrate,in fact,inter-regional trade,the core of the
 
Smithian growth,greatly expanded in Ming and Qing.The long line of
 
research on market integration based on statistical correlation of
 
regional grain prices in China seem to confirm a reasonably high degree
 
of market integration and efficiency in 18th century China, possibly
 
rivalling or even exceeding that of contemporaneous Europe???.
Terada attempted the reconstruction of a traditional Chinese social
 
order where rights were vaguely defined and rules flexibly interpreted
 
and thus disputes over properties and contracts often resolved or
 
regulated through the interplay of social norms, power, compromise
 
and rational recognition of long-term benefit and cost (Shiga et al,pp.
191-279).Beneath the thin layer of“formal”social order were the more
 
prevalent informal and internal rules in the form of family bylaws,
lineage rules and guild regulations which helped ensure properties and
 
contracts within the organization.
This mechanism is not particularly unique to China. Adopting a
 
game-theoretic framework, Avner Greif pointed out that a Jewish
 
trading group in the late-Medieval Mediterranean,the Magribi traders,
organised their group as an information sharing coalition with multilat-
eral or collective punishment strategies to deter opportunistic behav-
iour and sustain long-distance trade on a long-term basis in the absence
 
of formal legal mechanism. This strategy, known in the theory of
 
repeated games as reputation mechanism,was the key to the revival of
10）See Shiue and Keller (2004)for a comparison of degree of market integration in China
 
and Europe.
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commerce in Mediterranean Europe during the late-Medieval period.
A key feature to the Chinese commercial organization in traditional
 
China is the lineage or native place-based merchant groups???.Recent
 
research revealed that Chinese lineage as a form of social and economic
 
organisation was far more dynamic and flexible than previously under-
stood. For example, David Faure pointed out that lineage, as distin-
guished from family,has a distinctive‘corporate’character:properties
 
were owned in the name of lineage with perpetuities lasting beyond the
 
lives of any individual members;rights to partake in the distributions
 
of lineage assets were regarded as shares (fen) that depended on
 
contributions rather than descent; the managers had the rights and
 
responsibilities,to manage,but not to dispose of the property without
 
the consent of the lineage segments concerned.
Lineages could expand or contract through the so-called lineage
 
union (lianzhong)-different lineages combining their genealogies (ton-
gpu)and amalgamating under a common ancestor,who,in most cases,
was actually fictitious.Sometimes a lineage union could result in the
 
formation of giant lineage encompassing several tens or even hundreds
 
of thousands members across counties or even provinces governed by
 
elaborate internal rules.The motivation behind lineage union,as most
 
scholars agree,seemed economic and political more than anything else.
Resources pooled by lineages provided important local public goods:
charities for the poor,education funds for the young and promising,and
 
opportunities for commercial and financial expansion.
Thus, a region’s degree of commercialisation seemed to positively
 
correlate with the strength of its lineage organisations.For example,
11）See Zhang Zhongmin (1995)for the ten merchant groups.
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lineage practices were most widespread in China’s most commercial-
ized Pearl River and the Lower Yangzi delta.The most prominent and
 
sophisticated lineage-based merchant group is from around Huizhou
 
city area of Anhui province, also called the Hui Merchants. Trust
 
among Hui lineages provided credit,capital and business partnership.
Lineage members and very often their domestic servants were the main
 
staff members of the firms:managers,accountants,runners or agents
 
across distant trading towns. The careful compilation and constant
 
update of lineage genealogies served the important function of informa-
tion gathering and commercial networking.Genealogies often served as
 
the practical roadmap for the Hui migrant merchants.
The organisational strength brought them unmatched competitive-
ness. In Nanjing, the coordination of 500 Hui merchant pawnshops
 
drove out Fujian merchants with below-market interest rates. In
 
Yangzhou (Northern Jiangsu),Hui merchants usurped the once domi-
nant share of the Shanxi group in the highly profitable salt trade under
 
government monopoly. Soon, trade in ink and printing products in
 
Shanghai,grain and lumber in Wuhu,Anhui province and textiles in the
 
Lower Yangzi, was to become their mainstay. Along the Yangzi,
particularly the Lower Yangzi,their presence became so ubiquitous as
 
to give rise to the saying that ‘no Hui, no market towns’(huhui bu
 
chengzheng).
The second largest merchant group originated in Shanxi province
 
from Northern China, where lineage ties were professedly weaker.
Through a native-place-based network,the Shanxi merchants became
 
well-known for their operation of a nationwide money remittance
 
service from the 19th century.The so-called piaohao,was a banking
 
firm that provided merchants and long-distance travellers with drafts
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that they could exchange for cash at a specified branch after they
 
reached their destination,thus effectively reducing the cost and risk of
 
carrying bulky metallic cash.
By the mid-19th century, dozens of piaohao firms based in three
 
Shanxi counties were setting up branch offices throughout major
 
commercial cities in China,and turning, of all the places in China,a
 
remote,little-known city,Pinyao,into the financial hub of a nationwide
 
network of money remittance. After the turn of the century, they
 
reached into Japan and Korea.Thus,for an entire century until the fall
 
of Qing in 1911,the Shanxi bankers had locked up the money transfer
 
business in China.
While the capital of a piaohao was based on business partnership or
 
individual proprietorship with unlimited liability,the daily operation of
 
a piaohao was actually run by outside managers and staff with minimal
 
or no interference from its owners.In fact,as Zhang Zhongmin pointed
 
out,many firms had an explicit exclusion clause barring the hiring of
 
staff related to their owners.
The second feature of piaohao is its reward structure.The assets of
 
a piaohao consisted of capital share(ninggu)from owners and labour
 
shares (shenggu)from managers and staff.Labour shares entitled staff
 
to partake in the share of dividends from profits,a scheme in striking
 
resemblance to the modern profit-sharing scheme designed as a way to
 
provide incentives that align the interests of employees with the long-
term interest of their company.
Finally,what made this surprisingly‘modern’system tick was the
 
addition of a third,very‘traditional’element:all hiring was restricted
 
to Shanxi natives only. Usually an apprentice system was used to
 
recruit staff locally(including those to be sent to branch offices outside
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Shanxi)after careful background checks and often with their families
 
or other reliable third parties as their guarantors.Any staff member
 
caught and dismissed for fraudulent behaviour,as was reported,would
 
be denied future employment opportunities by all Shanxi bankers.
Clearly, the peace of mind of those who willingly parted with their
 
silver taels-sometimes their life-savings’worth-for a piece of a draft
 
paper, rested almost solely on the incorruptible reputation of the
 
Shanxi bankers???.
In spite of the legal“disconnect”or gulf between the private order
 
and public institutions under China’s centralized bureaucratic system,
the linkage between the Chinese merchant group and the government
 
evolved on a trajectory distinctive from the West.The highly competi-
tive Civil Service Examination system provided Chinese people a
 
relatively open and impartial, albeit highly competitive access to the
 
formal bureaucracy and power structure. Successful examinees who
 
became gentry or bureaucrats were entitled to taxation and legal
 
privileges.In view of the status of bureaucrats as administrators,tax
 
collectors and legal arbiters, this system generated enormous
 
incentives-or rather distortions-for Chinese society, particularly mer-
chant groups whose accumulated wealth was most vulnerable to the
 
damages of arbitrary power.
In Guangdong, Lower Yangzi and elsewhere, lineage properties,
lineage union and other social organisations were invested and formed
 
deliberately to enhance the chances of success at the examination by
 
their own candidates.It is precisely in this area that the Hui merchants
 
scored the highest. In Huizhou, residents took pride in their long
12）The narrative is based on my review article. See Ma (2004c) for details and full
 
references.
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tradition of Confucius learning and their proven track record in turning
 
out successful candidates for the Civil Service Examination.Huizhou
 
natives claimed a disproportionate share in Chinese bureaucracy.The
 
bureaucrat-merchant nexus is important in accounting for the dominant
 
position of the Shanxi and Huizhou merchants in salt trade under
 
government monopoly and later Shanxi bankers’role as Qing’s official
 
agents of money remittance???.
Therefore,the contrasting political structures between China and the
 
West had generated differential linkages between the private order and
 
public institutions.Clearly,if Chinese merchants could not shape public
 
or formal rules,they resorted to penetration into the formal political
 
structure through their investments in Confucian education.
．Law and Economic Growth
 
What is the relative economic efficiency implication of such a strat-
egy?From a societal resource allocation point of view, the massive
 
investment in the preparation of government Civil Service examination
 
clearly entails efficiency loss???. But in pre-modern societies, such
 
efficiency loss was probably not unique to China and was possibly far
 
outweighed by the benefits gained from more secure property rights
 
and contract enforcement.In fact,Bin Wong argued that if the informal
 
mechanism adopted by Chinese merchants had served well its intended
 
purpose, there was after all, no basis to view the European type of
 
transition to public enforcement as necessarily superior (Wong, 2001,
13）See Ma (2004c)for reference and review of the bureaucrat-merchant nexus.
14）For an argument that the Civil Service Examination as both resource misallocation and
 
a retarding factor on the growth of scientific knowledge in China,see Justin Li(1995).
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pp.399-401).
However,this neglects at least two more important efficiency losses.
First, as is true everywhere, bureaucratic-merchant coalitions are
 
highly prone to monopoly and rent seeking,leading to dead-weight loss
 
to the society in general. Second and most important, as argued by
 
Greif and others,in a relation and group-based mechanism,the extent
 
of exchange and the scale of operations may be subject to sharply rising
 
costs of information and coordination as the group and extent of trade
 
expands.In contrast,an enforceable legal system with a set of codified
 
and transparent standards and rules,subject to the interpretation and
 
contestation of independent third parties may be more costly to set up
 
initially but could exhibit strong scale economies to sustain larger
 
volumes of trade,thus conducive to the rise of large-scale impersonal
 
exchange beyond the internal groups (Greif,2002,2004,John Li).
Figure 1, adapted from John Shuhe Li’s paper, illustrates the two
 
average transaction cost curves for what he termed a relation-based
 
system versus a rule-based system.With relatively low fixed cost and
 
high marginal cost,the relation-based transaction cost curve is upward
 
sloping and starts out with lower average cost than the downward
 
sloping rule-based cost curve characterized by high fixed cost and low
 
marginal cost.However,over time as the scale of transactions or the
 
extent of market grows, average transaction costs for the relation-
based system increase sharply and exceed those for the rule-based
 
system beyond the turning point.
This diagrammatic illustration of the diminishing returns to scale
 
nature of the informal or relation-based mechanism has also been noted
 
by sociologists and legal scholars on China. Liang Ziping quoted an
 
analogy by the eminent Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotong who likens the
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 reach and influence of Chinese social order as circles of ripples stirred
 
up by a stone thrown into the water:the farther away from the center,
the weaker their strength becomes(Liang,pp.157-8).Liang’s own
 
extensive study of various private contracts and customs leads him to
 
emphaticaly conclude that Chinese local rules and customs were only
 
binding and effective within their existing social networks(p.165-6).
Further research is needed before we can begin to identify or test
 
empiricaly the relative efficiency hypothesis.However,some casual
 
comparison could provide us a beginning towards formulating a testa-
ble hypothesis.For example,most of the modern financial and commer-
cial instruments such as paper money,bils of exchange,bils of lading,
joint-stock shares or insurance contracts as wel as forward or futures
 
markets could be found in their embryonic form in East Asia.However,
it was only in Western Europe that these instruments and markets
 
developed to a large scale and later diffused worldwide while they
 
Figure 1.Average Transaction Cost for Relation-based System
 
versus Rule-based System
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remained highly localized and segmented in East Asia. Is it possible
 
that the differential scale effects from the divergent legal traditions
 
may have mattered?
In fact,contrasting patterns of economic and organizational transfor-
mations in East Asia under the impact of Western influence from the
 
mid-19th century provide an illuminating test case of the relative
 
efficiencies in legal systems.One of the pillars of Meiji reform in Japan
 
was the adaptive introduction of Western legal institutions ranging
 
from constitution to commercial law,to modern accounting and joint
 
stock corporation.In China,legal reform was much delayed until after
 
the turn of the 20th century when the first set of civil and commercial
 
codes were being compiled with the aid of Japanese legal specialists.
But with the collapse of the Qing empire and the nation thrown into
 
civil disorder after 1911,the implementation of legal and institutional
 
reform was severely curtailed. As I argued elsewhere, much of the
 
economic divergence in today’s East Asia could be traced to the
 
differential patterns of political and institutional response to the
 
Western challenge in the mid-19th century(Ma 2004a).
Institutional and legal change did take place in early 20th century
 
China in an very different context.The imposition of extraterritorial
 
rights and the transplantation of a Western legal system in China’s
 
treaty ports from the mid-19th century-with all due condemnation for
 
their demoralizing  and destabilizing  consequence on Chinese
 
sovereignty-served an indispensable function for guaranteeing the secu-
rity of Western private banking and trading houses whose scale of
 
capital and transactions by then far exceeded those of the traditional
 
Chinese merchants.But an unintended consequence of this transfer was
 
that those treaty port territories dominated by a Western legal justice
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system had spawned a class of Chinese industrial and financial entre-
preneurs, whose fortune and capital by the early 20th century had
 
reached a level and scale unparalleled throughout Chinese history.
More importantly,the organization of merchant groups began to evolve
 
in new directions???.
In Shanghai, for example, the so-called Ningbo clique, merchants
 
from around the city of Ningpo in Zhejiang province, acquired a
 
dominating presence in Shanghai’s rapidly growing native and later
 
modern banking sectors through the cultivation of lineage and native-
place ties (Susan Mann 1974). But by the early 20th century when
 
Shanghai became a full-fledged Western style city-state, institutional
 
changes were coming to the Shanghai Native Bank Association
 
dominated by the Ningbo financial clique.
In a recent study based on newly opened archive materials, Du
 
Xuncheng analyses the elaborate rules and regulations designed by the
 
Shanghai Native Bank Association to ensure the rights and creditwor-
thiness of its member banks in an era of political and national disinte-
gration. In particular,he notes that the Association’s rules for entry
 
and exit of member native banks were entirely based on a bank’s
 
financial position.Moreover, the Association rules on dispute resolu-
tion, being formally published and distributed,very often formed the
 
legal principles for financial litigation in the relatively independent
 
Shanghai mixed court. In cases when the legitimate rights of its
 
member native banks were violated by other agents outside Shanghai
 
and negotiation for settlement failed,the Association often resorted to
 
the multi-lateral punishment strategy by notifying all its member banks
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15）See Ma (2004b) for the Shanghai-based industrialization and the role of City-state
 
institutions.
to suspend any future transaction with that agent.Over time,their rules
 
gained increasing recognition and often became the guiding principles
 
for native banks outside Shanghai(Du Xuncheng 2004).It was possibly
 
this mix as well as the transition between informal and formal mecha-
nism of contract enforcement that supported the rapid growth of native
 
banks in Shanghai,which became the most important agent of indus-
trial finance in Shanghai’s so-called golden 1920s.
Summary
 
Our debate on the“Great Divergence”should integrate the divergent
 
traditions in legal traditions and institutions between China and the
 
West in the early modern period.To the extent that those institutional
 
and epistemological elements that underpinned the legal revolution in
 
the 11th and 12th century in the West-the separation between Church
 
and the state,the emergence of independent territorial jurisdiction,the
 
pursuit of transcendental,objective and rectifiable standards-were also
 
relevant,as argued by Toby Huff,for the rise of scientific revolution in
 
early modern Europe,one needs to take seriously the linkage between
 
legal institution and the origin of industrial revolution.
The divergent legal traditions are not an independent phenomenon
 
but rather the historical outcome or derivative of contrasting differ-
ences in the political and social structures,namely, the political frag-
mentation and separation between religion and the secular in the West
 
versus the dominance of a centralized bureaucratic empire in China.
But different legal traditions in turn would exert varying impact on the
 
security of properties and contracts.The differential scale economies in
 
formal and informal institutions for resolving commercial and civil
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disputes may have mattered little in the short run when trade and
 
exchange were limited,but could potentially give rise to sharply diver-
gent patterns of commercial and industrial organization,monetary and
 
financial system over the long-run.However, it is important to note
 
that this relative economic efficiency implication of divergent legal
 
traditions is itself a positive statement and should not be viewed as a
 
normative verdict on the relative merits of comparative civilizations.
The Western experience shows that private social order not only
 
constitutes the evolutionary basis for public institutions but also con-
tinues to play an indispensable role even in modern economies.In East
 
Asia,the inherited cultural and institutional endowments are essential
 
to the making of economic miracles. The long experience of social
 
networks,communities and informal institutions accumulated in East
 
Asia helped reduce transaction costs and supplied trust to enable
 
economic growth to occur in the 19th and 20th centuries even before the
 
clarification and reform of formal rules and institutions. The tradi-
tional preference for flexibility over fixed rules may have helped
 
Chinese reform in the early 1980s to successfully evade much of the
 
ideological rigidities with little social tension and contributed to the
 
spontaneous emergence of institutional innovations of a highly experi-
mental and ad-hoc nature often missing in other transitional economies.
Zeal for learning,which survived far beyond the collapse of the Civil
 
Service Examination in 1906, formed the cultural foundation for the
 
rapid accumulation of human capital in much of Confucian East Asia.
What probably distinguished East Asia from the rest of the developing
 
world today, or what Max Weber had failed to anticipate, is her
 
learning capacity to absorb not only Western technology but also
 
formal institutions-from legal system,to state-building and to monetary
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regimes.Both China’s current difficulties encountered in transition to
 
the rule of law and the recent Asian financial crisis are a timely
 
reminder of the continued need for institutional learning and innova-
tion.
Consequently,the economic success of modern East Asia cannot be
 
explained by either the slavish imitation of Western institutions or the
 
resilience of traditional ideology or institutions alone. Rather it is
 
reminiscent of a more universal historical phenomenon:the renaissance
 
of ancient civilization through the infusion of external influence.In this
 
light, the claim by the revisionists that, had the coal deposits been
 
located in the right spot, or had new territories been discovered and
 
opened up, the 18th century China or East Asia-way before all the
 
wrenching ideological and institutional revolutions under the 19-20th
 
century Western impact-could have engineered an industrial revolution
 
all on their own,is pressing its luck too hard.
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Institutional Perspective on the“Great Divergence”
Debin MA
《Abstract》
In the West,legal tradition was generally characterized by the use of
 
external and relatively fixed rules or precedents with independent third
 
party enforcement.In China,the legal structure was part of the govern-
ment bureaucracy that often relied on the use of general and flexible
 
legal and ethical principles to mediate civil and commercial disputes.
This paper provides a review on the debate on China’s traditional legal
 
system in a comparative perspective. It shows that lineage and native-
place based Chinese merchant groups resorted to a reputation mecha-
nism and informal and internal rules to enforce contracts and secure
 
property rights.As the Western type of rule-based system exhibits scale
 
economies with rising efficiency at higher volumes of exchange,partic-
ularly impersonal exchange,I argue that divergent legal traditions shed
 
crucial insights to the differential patterns of long-term economic
 
growth and the“great divergence”between China and the West in the
 
modern era.
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